The literature provides conflicting assessments about firms' leverage decisions. We argue that econometric mis-specifications have influenced many past conclusions, because the estimated regression models implicitly impose strong, but unwarranted, assumptions on the data. This study estimates a partial-adjustment model for a firm's leverage decision. Our model recognizes that a firm's target capital structure can change over time and that (unanticipated) share price changes also have on effect on observed leverage. Our results indicate that firms do have specific target capital structures, and that they adjust quickly toward those targets when a gap arises. We estimate that the typical firm closes more than half the gap between its actual and its target debt ratios within two years.
Since the publication of Modigliani and Miller's "irrelevance proposition" in 1958 , corporate finance researchers have investigated the theoretical and empirical determinants of a firm's financing composition.
Initially, researchers asked whether MM's irrelevance proposition was consistent with the available data, or if real-world firms chose to operate with target debt-equity ratios reflecting their costs and benefits of operating with leverage. Myers [1984] contrasted this tradeoff theory of capital structure with a modified "pecking order" theory, under which firms first use internal funds to finance investment requirements and as a second choice, issue safe debt. According to the pecking order hypothesis, equity issuance occurs only as a last resort, because investors tend to discount risky securities issued by firms with potentially large information asymmetries. Pecking order financing thus minimizes the impact of external investors' misperceptions on the firm's market value. With such lexicographic financing preferences, a firm's observed leverage reflects its historical profitability and need for new investment funds, not a trade off among firm characteristics that would generate a specific leverage target. Many papers have investigated whether the target ratio or the pecking order hypothesis better characterized the data on firm leverage (for example, Shyam-Sunder and Myers [1999] , Hovakimian, Opler and Titman [2001] , Fama and French [2002] , Frank and Goyal [2003] ).
Recently, Baker and Wurgler [2002] have inverted the pecking order hypothesis, in a sense, by contending that a firm's observed capital structure reflects its cumulative ability to sell overpriced equity shares. Firms tend to issue securities when their market-to-book ratios are temporarily high, because managers maximize existing shareholders' returns by selling overpriced securities to misinformed outsiders. Like the pecking order hypothesis, this "market timing" hypothesis denies the primacy of a target capital ratio. Kayhan and Titman [2003] and Hovakimian [2003] argue that Baker and Wurgler mis-interpret their primary variable, which is a weighted average of the firm's past market-to-book ratios. Rather than reflecting past security mispricings, these authors contend that Baker and Wurgler's weighted average of past market-to-book ratios measures the firm's long-term growth options. They argue that the substantial impact of this variable on firm leverage is therefore consistent with the tradeoff theory: firms with greater long-run growth opportunities choose to operate with less leverage. Welch [forthcoming] also contrasts the relevance of market price fluctuations against tradeoff issues.
He investigates whether actual debt ratios by-and-large behave as if firms readjust to their previous debt ratios (targeting a largely static target), or whether they permit their debt ratios to fluctuate with stock prices. (page 3)
The alternate hypothesis in this study denies the relevance of a target capital ratio, without asserting that managers can expropriate value from asymmetrically informed market investors. Welch concludes that over reasonably long time frames, the stock price effects are considerably more important in explaining debt-equity ratios than all previously identified proxies together. (page 2) That is, firms' market value debt ratios do not reflect rational tradeoffs. Yet at the same time, Graham and Harvey's [2001] survey evidence indicates that 81% of firms consider a target debt ratio or target range when making their debt decisions.
We contend that most of the regression specifications used in previous empirical studies of firm leverage have imposed unwarranted (but testable) restrictions on the data. 1 We identify several potential econometric problems in past studies, of which one lies at the heart of the capital structure debate: whether firms fully adjust their debt ratios to new information within one year. Baker and Wurgler [2002] state that
The basic question is whether market timing has a short-run or a long-run impact. One expects at least a mechanical, short-run impact. However, if firms subsequently rebalance away from the influence of market timing financing decisions, as normative capital structure theory recommends, then market timing would have no persistent impact on capital structure. (page 2, emphasis added)
If previous studies have inappropriately constrained firms to adjust more rapidly than transaction costs would allow, they may have distorted conclusions about whether "firms subsequently rebalance away from" shocks to their leverage.
We develop a model with two important features. First, our model allows for the possibility that firm target capital structures can move over time. Second, we allow for firms to adjust gradually toward their target 1 Jalilavand and Harris [1984] is an early exception. More recently, Fama and French [2002] estimate a model with adjustment speeds and a long-run target leverage, but their estimation method (Fama-MacBeth) may be biased due to implicit constraints placed on the model (see section IV below). In addition, they focus on explaining dividends rather than leverage per se.
capital structure when deviations are caused either through the target changing or through stock price shocks.
Our specification includes most of the previous researchers' models as constrained cases and our results indicate that these constraints materially influence the estimated coefficients and consequently their theoretical implications. Overall our results strongly support the tradeoff hypothesis of capital structure. We find robust evidence that U.S. firms operate with a target leverage ratio, and act to restore deviations from their targets with a mean half-life adjustment time of slightly less than two years. Some earlier researchers (e.g., Bayless
and Chaplinsky [1990] , Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman [2001] ) use an estimated target capital ratio to predict what sort of securities will be issued next. We do not specify the mechanism by which capital ratios are adjusted, but we do present evidence that managers take explicit steps to move toward their targets. These findings raise serious doubt about the hypotheses that pecking order or market timing decisions explain most of the observed variation in corporate capital ratios The paper is organized as follows. Section I derives our preferred specification for empirical tests concerning a firm's leverage. This model specification imposes no strong assumptions about the determinants of a target debt ratio, the speed of adjustment toward that ratio, or the impact of share price changes on firms' preferred leverage. Section II describes the data we use to estimate our regression models. Section III discusses the most appropriate econometric methods for estimating this model, and Section IV compares our partial adjustment model to models used by earlier researchers. We examine the determinants of a firm's target debt ratio in the following section. Section VI demonstrates that managers take explicit steps to adjust toward their target capital ratios, and that these steps are reflected in changes in the firm's book debt ratio. Section VII discusses the robustness of our results and Section VIII explicitly compares our model to the pecking order and market timing models. The final section summarizes and concludes.
I. Regression Model Specification
Past empirical studies of firm leverage rely on regression specifications with three potential shortcomings. First, some researchers have limited the possibility that a firm's target leverage might exist, or that it might vary over time. Second, some researchers have not acknowledged that firms may require multiple time periods to attain their desired (target) capital ratios. Third, models of a firm's market-valued debt ratio have not appropriately incorporated the impact of share price changes on the observed debt ratio. The shortcomings of some previous econometric specifications are best illustrated vis-à-vis our own, general, model.
A. Target Leverage
Define a firm's market debt ratio at time t as:
where D it = book value of all debt (the sum of Compustat items 9 plus 34) at time t E it = market value of firm i's equity (Compustat Item 199 times item 25) at time t.
We model the possibility that a firm's target leverage might differ across firms or over time by specifying a target capital ratio of the form:
where MDR it * is firm i's desired debt ratio at the end of period t;
X it is a vector of firm characteristics related to the costs and benefits of operating with various leverage ratios; and β is a vector of coefficients. Under the tradeoff hypothesis, β ≠ 0.
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Previous authors have identified a relatively small set of relevant "X" variables (Harris and Raviv [1991] , Hovakimian et al. (2001) , Rajan and Zingales (1995) , Lemmon and Zender [2001] , Frank and Goyal [2003] , Faulkender and Peterson [2003] , Johnson [2003] ), and we identify some of them in Section II below.
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We use a market-valued definition of leverage, in order to incorporate more explicitly the impact of share price changes on observed leverage. Previous researchers using this definition include Hovakimian et al. [2001] , Hovakimian [2003] , Fama and French [2002] , and Welch [forthcoming]. We define "debt" as all debt liabilities (Compustat items 9 plus 34), and equity as common shares. Section II and Table 1 provide further  details. However, some researchers have not permitted the data to determine whether firm-specific, time-varying factors affect desired leverage. Some authors have assumed that the firm's target ratio equals its average ratio across the sample period (Jalilvand and Harris [1984] , Shyam-Sunder and Myers [1999] ). This specification constrains a firm's leverage-relevant characteristics to remain unchanged across quite long sample periods.
Moreover, such a specification does not permit external conditions (such as the Tax Reform Act of 1986) to influence target leverage. 4 Jalilvand and Harris [1984] also use a modified form of this assumption, specifying a firm's target leverage as a trailing average of its past three (or five) years observed leverage ratios. 5 Welch
[forthcoming] specifies that each firm's target capital ratio equals its observed value at the end of the preceding period (MDR i t-1 ).
Other researchers have assumed that firms within an industry share a common target capital ratio, toward which all firms adjust over time. This assumption presumes that firms within the same industry have similar debt-equity tradeoffs. Yet MacKay and Philips [2002] find "that most of the variation in financial structure arises within industries rather than between industries." (page 2). We find that the industry median leverage ratio significantly affects target leverage, perhaps capturing industry specific determinants of leverage, but it does not displace the traditional variables determining target leverage.
B. Speed of Adjustment to Target Leverage
Even when researchers have included appropriate X it variables in equation (2), many have implicitly assumed that firms adjust to their target capital structures within one time period (usually a year). However, it seems quite plausible that a firm's actual MDR would not converge to its target value (MDR it *) within a year.
Business conditions may engender an unforeseen change in liabilities, or issuing/redeeming market securities may entail adjustment costs. Given sticky dividends, earnings surprises will affect leverage. In addition, share 4 Korajczyk and Levy [2002] find that corporate sector profits, equity returns, and the commercial paper spread affect firms' target leverage ratios.
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Jalilavand and Harris [1984] find reasonable coefficient estimates for equation (2) and reasonable adjustment speeds when they use such a trailing average to proxy for the firm's target. By contrast, Shaym-Sunder and Myers [1999] describe unreported results for which "when the target is based on a three-or five-year rolling average of the book debt ratio up to the preceding year, the adjustment coefficients are not significant." (page 228). price changes affect MDR if managers do not properly offset their effects. Any financial (or other) cost of adjusting leverage may prevent immediate adjustment to a firm's target debt ratio, as the firm trades off these adjustment costs against the costs of operating with a sub-optimal debt ratio. To allow for this possibility, we specify a functional form that permits partial adjustment of the firm's initial capital ratio to its target. The data may then determine how quickly this adjustment occurs, rather than having the researcher impose an adjustment speed via her regression specification. A standard partial adjustment model can be written:
Equation (3) specifies that the observed change in a firm's leverage constitutes a partial movement from where it is (MDR i,t ) to where it would like to be (MDR i,t *, from equation (2)). The typical firm closes a proportion λ 1 of the gap each year. 7 Substitute (2) into (3) to give an estimable model
Theory implies that 0 ≤ λ 1 ≤ 1, although we do not impose this restraint in our estimates.
From (4), we see that estimating target leverage in a simple cross-sectional regression implicitly assumes that firms always attain their target leverage ratios within one time period. When λ 1 = 1, (4) becomes simply
= MDR i,t * + µ i, t+1
If adjustment costs are non-trivial, however, (4) is the true model and restricting λ 1 = 1 may bias coefficient estimates. Perhaps in an effort to capture some type of partial adjustment, some researchers estimate the target debt ratio in first differences: 6 Evidence in Figure 2 below indicates that firms adjust toward a target ratio infrequently, but in relatively large steps.
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The specification (3) assumes that the firm acts to close any deviation from the desired target ratio, no matter how small. An alternative model would permit small deviations from the target to persist because adjustment costs outweigh the gains from removing small deviations between actual and target leverage. We leave this model for future research. Furthermore, at the end of Section VI we describe how this smooth adjustment specification reflects lumpy firm adjustments derived from fixed adjustment costs.
However, (6) is equivalent to (5) for a linear model; both specifications assume that full adjustment occurs within one time period.
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C. The Effect of Changes in a Firm's Share Price
A firm's market debt ratio can change because of explicit managerial actions or simply because the firm's share price changed. In order to incorporate the latter effect into our regression specification (4), rewrite the market value of equity (E it ) in (1) as the product of shares outstanding (S it ) and is the price per share
Totally differentiating (7) yields an expression for the change in MDR between time t and time t+1:
where dD represents the net value of bonds issued (dD > 0) or redeemed (dD < 0) between t and t+1; dS represents net number of new shares issued (if dS > 0) or repurchased (if dS < 0) between t and t+1; and dP is the change in share price (net of dividends and adjusted for splits) between t and t+1.
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The first term on the RHS of (8) measures the net effect of explicit managerial actions on the firm's initial debt ratio, while the second term describes the impact of change in share price.
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Some researchers have added a lagged dependent variable to the RHS of (6). Baker and Wurgler [2002] do not interpret the resulting regression as a partial adjustment model, nor do they report that variable's estimated coefficient (see their Table II ). Kayhan and Titman [2003] pay some attention to the implied adjustment speeds, but find slower adjustments than we report here. 9 We soon distinguish between expected and unexpected (shocks) changes to the stock price.
While (8) describes a firm's actual leverage change over a period, it says nothing about how managers choose dD and dS. The partial adjustment model (4) specifies a decision rule to be tested, but that rule does not reflect the impact of share price changes on observed leverage. We add to (4) a second partial adjustment process by which managers may offset the undesired effects of share price change:
The second term measures the net effect of a share price change, after managers have taken explicit actions to offset a proportion λ 2 of the gross effect. The derivative of the second term in (9) equals
so the model we wish to test becomes
Re-write (10) as
which is the regression we estimate. We see from (8) that the dependent variable in (10a) measures the effect of explicit managerial actions on the firm's debt ratio. Moreover, (8) further indicates that the dependent variable in (10a) is completely unaffected by contemporaneous price changes (dP). The residual in (10a) is thus unrelated to dP, and we can estimate (10a) without concern about endogeneous variables on the RHS.
Theory implies one further modification to (11). The standard partial adjustment specification takes a firm's position at the end of the preceding period as the logical starting point for planned adjustments. For many applications, this is entirely appropriate. However, a firms MDR changes with share prices, even if the managers take no explicit actions. It may be more appropriate to define the firm's starting point as the debt ratio it expects to have in the absence of explicit managerial actions. We think of the expected debt ratio (EDR it ) as the firm's market debt ratio at year-end if managers "do nothing" during the year. More precisely "nothing" means dS = dD = 0. Mangers issue no new shares and exactly replace maturing debt. This EDR it reflects debt and shares outstanding at the end of period t, plus the effect of the expected share price change between t and t+1. We can re-write (10a) to distinguish the effects of anticipated vs. unanticipated share price changes as follows:
where E(P t ) is the share price at t, E(dP) is the expected share price change between t and t+1, based on information available at t, EDR t is the debt ratio managers expect to have at t+1 if they do nothing and the share price changes by E(dP). That is,
Surp t measures the impact of unanticipated share price changes on the firm's MDR:
δ is a random error term.
We compute E(P) as if assets are priced according to the CAPM and all shares have a beta of unity. Thus, all firms have the same expected return within a year, given by the contemporaneous 10-year treasury rate plus a 5% market risk premium.
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This derivation assumes that managers react to expected changes in their MDR at a rate λ 1 . Unanticipated effects of the firm's own price change on MDR are offset at an annual rate λ 2 , which we expect to be smaller than λ 1 . Substituting (2) into (11) and re-naming the dependent variable gives the specification that forms the basis of our regression estimates:
Note what (12) implies about the firm's long-run (fully-adjusted) leverage position.
1) The firm eventually converges on its target debt ratio, βX i,t .
2) The long-run impact of X i, t on the capital ratio is given by its estimated coefficients, divided by λ 1 .
3) In the long run, leverage is unrelated to unanticipated share price changes, because the price surprise is zero in the long run.
The smooth partial adjustment in (12) may only approximate an individual firm's actual adjustments. With fixed security-issuance costs, firms may not adjust until their actual MDR is sufficiently far from target (Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner [1989] , Mauer and Triantis [1994] ). The adjustment speeds (λ 1 and λ 2 ) are thus average speeds for the "typical" firm. We return to the validity of this assumption at the end of Section V and in Table 8 below.
It is also possible that adjustment speeds are firm specific. We have experimented by modeling λ to be a function of firm specific variables, i.e.
where Y is a set of firm characteristics that determine its specific adjustment speed. Although we find evidence of firm specific determinants of adjustment speeds (Y is statistically significant), we do not report it here because the mean adjustment speeds (λ 1 (Y ) and λ 2 (Y )) and the coefficients on X it are very similar to the results of estimating (12).
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Note that (12) is a linear regression, from which we can extract estimated β coefficients by dividing the estimated coefficients on X it by the estimated λ 1 . Marcus [1983] estimates a very similar specification when trying to explain large bank holding companies' book leverage ratios.
II. Data
We construct our sample from all firms present in the Compustat Industrial Annual tapes between the years 1965 and 2001. Following previous researchers, we exclude financial firms (SIC 6000 -6999) and regulated firms (SIC 4900-4999) because their capital decisions may reflect special factors. Because our regression specification includes a lagged dependent variable, we must also exclude any firm with fewer than two consecutive years of data. After these exclusions, we are left with 12,919 firms with complete information for 111,106 firm-year observations. Table 1 defines the variables used in our study and reports their summary statistics. All of these variables are winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentile to avoid the influence of extreme observations. Most of our variables are expressed as ratios. Where this is not the case (e.g. LnTA), we deflate the nominal magnitudes by the consumer price index, to express all values in 1983 dollars.
Some prior studies exclude smaller firms from the analysis, because their adjustment costs may be unusually large or their leverage determinants might be significantly different. We include all firms in our estimations, but Table 6 reports estimates of the main regression model for various firm size classes.
(Surprisingly, smaller firms adjust slightly more quickly to capital structure shocks.) Sample firms use a variety of fiscal year endings and hence we define annual observations based on fiscal as opposed to calendar time. In other words, in constructing time dummy variables we treat all firms the same whose fiscal year end occurs in the same calendar year.
To model a target debt ratio, we use a set of firm characteristics (X i,t ) that appear regularly in the literature (Rajan and Zingales [1995] , Hovakimian [2003] , Hovakimian, Opler and Titman [2001] , Fama and French [2002] ). These variables are defined in Table 1 . Their expected effects on the target debt ratio are as follows.
EBIT_TA: Profitability. A firm with higher earnings could prefer to operate with either lower or higher leverage. Lower leverage might occur as higher retained earnings mechanically reduce leverage, or if the firm limits leverage to protect the "franchise" producing these high earnings. Higher leverage might reflect the firm's ability to meet debt payments out of its relatively high earnings cash flow.
MB:
Market to book ratio of assets. A higher MB ratio is generally taken as a sign of more attractive future growth options, which a firm tends to protect by limiting its leverage.
LnTA: Log of (real) total assets. Larger firms tend to have more leverage, perhaps because they are more transparent, have lower asset volatility, or naturally sell large enough debt issues that the fixed costs of public borrowing are not prohibitive.
DEP_TA:
Depreciation as a proportion of total assets. Firms with more depreciation expenses have less need for the interest deductions associated with debt financing.
FA_TA: Fixed asset proportion. Firms operating with greater tangible assets have a higher "debt capacity".
Rated:
Dummy variable equal to unity when the firm has a debt rating. Faulkender and Petersen [2003] find that firms with public debt ratings operate with substantially higher leverage.
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In addition to these specific variables, we will often include firm fixed effects among the determinants of target leverage. These dummy variables capture the impact of inter-temporally constant, but unmeasured, effects on target leverage. We assess the importance of these fixed effects below.
III. Estimation Methods
We now consider the appropriate econometric method for estimating (12). Fama and French [2002] argue "the standard errors in most previous capital structure tests are almost surely understated by large unknown amounts" (page 3). They prescribe the Fama-MacBeth [1973] methodology as "a simple way to obtain robust standard errors that capture whatever contributes to the precision of the average slopes" (page 3).
However, estimating (12) as a single cross-section ignores potential residual correlation across firms. Panel regressions also ignore these potential cross-sectional correlations but may yield efficiency gains by recognizing the effect of omitted variables that remain relatively constant within each firm. At the same time, a panel estimation introduces the possibility of biased coefficient estimates if the explanatory variables include a lagged dependent variable (Anderson and Hsiao [1981] , Arellano and Bond [1991] ). As Fama and French 12 Clearly Rated may be endogenous, and Faulkender and Petersen [2003] control for sample selectivity in their paper. We simply included Rated as an additional dependent variable, for two reasons. First, the impact of bond ratings is not a central concern for us. Second, our results are completely insensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of Rated from the set of X variables determining a firm's target debt ratio.
[2002] point out, there is also the possibility that the errors might be auto-correlated and hence an AR (1) correction may be appropriate for the estimation. Table 2 reports alternate estimators for the coefficients in (12). The first column presents FamaMacBeth (FM) estimates.
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Of the five (lagged) variables representing the target debt ratio (EBIT_TA, MB, lnTA, DEP/TA, and FA_TA) all except EBIT_TA carry significant coefficients with appropriate signs. (Tstatistics all exceed 6.) The coefficient on EDR implies that firms close only 11.1% of the gap between current and desired leverage within one year. In other words, it takes about six years to close half the gap between a typical firm's current and desired leverage ratios. This slow adjustment is consistent with the hypothesis that the cost of deviating from optimal leverage is viewed as relatively small. With such low estimated adjusted speeds, convergence toward a long-run target may explain little of the variation in firms' debt ratios. The coefficient on Surp (0.188) exceeds the speed of adjustment to ex ante known developments (0.111), which seems implausible. (However, we contend that this regression specification is incomplete.)
While the FM estimates have some attractive features, they fail to recognize the data's panel characteristics.
14 A panel regression with fixed (firm) effects would be a more appropriate estimator if firms have relatively stable, omitted variables that affect their leverage targets. Column (2) of Table 2 presents these results. An F-test for the joint significance of the firm fixed effects rejects the hypothesis that these terms are all equal (F(12918, 98180) = 2.06; pr = 0.000). The estimated coefficients on the determinants of target leverage generally resemble their FM counterparts, except for LnTA, However, the estimated coefficient on EDR now implies a substantially faster adjustment speed. The estimated annual adjustment speed of 25%
indicates that the typical firm closes almost half of its leverage gap within two years. The coefficient on Surp indicates that firms adjust equally quickly (24% annually) to unanticipated stock price changes. Even allowing 13 Each year, we ran a cross-sectional regression, and report the mean value of each coefficient and the intertemporal standard deviation of the estimates.
for a large understatement of the coefficient standard errors, these adjustment speeds both differ reliably from zero.
The more rapid adjustment speed in column (2) might reflect either the addition of firm fixed effects, or some difference between the panel and Fama-MacBeth methods of estimating coefficients. The regression in column (3) applies the FM method to "de-meaned" data for each firm. That is, each firm's variables in this regression have been expressed as deviations from that firm's mean value, which incorporates fixed effects to the estimation without constraining the slope coefficients to remain constant across the sample (as in column (2)). The FM estimates in column (3) are very close to the panel results in column (2). 15 We conclude that firm-specific effects substantially influence estimated adjustment speeds, but how one incorporates these effects (FM vs. panel estimation) is not terribly important. Column (4) estimates a revised panel model, which includes a separate dummy variable for each year in the sample (except 1966, to avoid the dummy variable trap). The adjusted R 2 statistic rises from 0.182 in column (2) to 0.204 here, but introducing the year dummies does not substantially affect the other coefficient estimates. We include year dummy variables in our subsequent panel regressions to absorb any un-modeled, time-varying influences on capital structure.
Column (5) presents the results of a fixed effects panel estimation when the residuals are permitted to follow an AR(1) process. The estimated serial correlation coefficient is -0.05. The adjustment speeds are very similar to column (4) and so are the coefficients on the X variables. Given the small estimated AR (1) coefficient, we proceed under the assumption that serial correlation is not a significant effect in our study.
Column (6) addresses the correlation between a panel's lagged dependent variable and the error term (Greene [2002] ). 16 We substitute a fitted value for the lagged dependent variable, using the lagged book value of leverage and X t as instruments. The estimated EDR coefficient rises slightly, now implying an annual 15 We also estimated, but do not report, a version of the specification in Column (2) that includes 46 industry dummy variables (constructed as in Fama and French [1997] ) in place of firm fixed effects. The results are very close to those in column (1), which also excludes firm fixed effects. 16 The lagged value of EDR is not, strictly speaking, a lagged dependent variable. However, because EDR includes lagged information on debt and stock issuances, we felt it most conservative to undertake these estimations as if lagged EDR were potentially correlated with the contemporaneous error term. Greene [2002, page 73] explains why the lagged dependent variable causes such a correlation. Comparing column (6) to column (4) incidates that the effect of this adjustment is not very large. adjustment speed of almost 30%. The other coefficient estimates resemble the results in Column (4), except that LnTA now carries a significant coefficient. The estimated 30% annual adjustment speed implies that the typical firm completes half of its required leverage adjustment within two years. This rapid adjustment toward a firm-specific capital ratio implies that the pecking order or market timing hypotheses cannot explain the majority of firms' debt ratio decisions.
Overall, our results in Table 2 suggest two conclusions about the appropriate estimation procedure.
First, each of the estimation procedures (AR(1) Vs. FM Vs. IV) yields similar coefficients. Second, it is very important to include firm fixed effects, that these dummy variables are picking up unidentified effects on target estimates. (We explore this issue further below). Going forward, we choose the IV estimation with firm fixed effects as our estimation procedure.
IV. Model Variations
The adjustment speeds implied by the fixed-effect estimates in Table 2 substantially exceed other estimates from the recent literature. However, our regression specification incorporates innovations in addition to these fixed effects. Given the importance of the estimated adjustment speeds for evaluating the tradeoff theory of capital structure, we must understand the source of these differences. The five columns in Table 3 transition in small steps from the typical specification used in prior studies (Column (1)) to our preferred specification (Column (5)).
The first column in Table 3 replicates commonly used (past) research specifications, which assume that complete adjustment occurs within one year (λ 1 =100%). As others find, the determinants of target leverage (X i,t ) carry appropriate coefficients. We switch to a basic partial adjustment specification in Column (2). The estimated coefficient on MDR t indicates an annual adjustment speed of 34.2% (t=176.02), and the R 2 statistic increases significantly from 17.9% to 46.6%. The implied determinants of target capital also vary somewhat, which we can see by comparing the estimated slopes in Column (1) with the implied long-run slopes in Column (2). The differences for EBIT_TA (-0.079 vs. -0.179) and DEP_TA (-0.670 vs. -0.209 ) are particularly large. But how much difference does the specification change make to the target debt ratios predicted in columns (1) and (2)? The average predicted target debt ratio from column (1) is 2.9% below the prediction from column (2). More importantly, the standard deviation of these differences is about 11%, compared to a mean observed debt ratio of 27.8%. In short, introducing partial adjustment to the model in column (1) substantially affects the predicted target ratios.
This raises concern about the two-stage estimation procedure used by a number of previous writers (e.g., French [2002], Hovakamian, Opler and Titman [2001] , Korajczyk and Levy [2002] ). In the first stage, they estimate a target leverage based on a model specification similar to column (1). In the second stage, they use the estimated target leverage to predict the type of security (debt vs. equity) next issued by a firm. If the true adjustment speeds differ from 100%, as Column (2) suggests, the second-stage coefficient estimates may be substantially biased.
In column (3), we show that replacing MDR t with the estimated "do nothing" end-of-period debt ratio EDR t . has little effect. The implied adjustment speed is now somewhat lower (31.6%), but the other coefficients are similar to column (2). In column (4), we replace the dependent variable with dMDR_P i, t+1 , which measures only explicit managerial actions, again with little change in the estimated coefficients. Finally, we arrive at our preferred specification (12) by adding Surp t in column (5). (This is the same specification as column (6) in Table 2 .) The inclusion of SURP increases the R 2 from 0.1136 to 0.202, with minor effects on the X variables' estimated coefficients. In sum, the differences between our results and previous researchers' conclusions derive from a combination of the partial adjustment specification (Table 3 ) and the introduction of fixed effects in the target debt ratio (as shown in Table 2 ).
We have noted that previous authors find that a relatively robust set of variables appear to determine a firm's target debt ratio. We reach a similar conclusion. Regardless of the specification or estimation method employed in Tables 2 and 3 , the variables meant to capture target leverage are highly significant, both individually and jointly. We easily reject the hypothesis that firms operate without a specific target leverage ratio. In Table 4 , we explore the ability of our X i t variables to compete with two other proxies for the target.
In the first column of Table 2 . Comparing the first column of Table 4 to the fifth column of Table 2 indicates that adding Rated to the specification has no meaningful effect on the other coefficient estimates, although Rated itself carries a significantly positive coefficient (t = 4.2).
Column (2) in Table 4 examines the performance of the industry's lagged median debt ratio as a measure of a firm's target leverage. (We use Fama-French [1997] industry definitions.) Although the coefficient on Ind_Median is highly significant (t = 7.4), its point estimate (0.043) seems small. (Perhaps this variable captures some industry-specific determinants of leverage that are difficult to identify.) When we combine Ind_Median with our six determinants of target leverage in Column (3), we find the X coefficients virtually unaffected. The hypothesis that the six original variables defining a target capital ratio all carry zero coefficients is strongly rejected (χ 2 = 669.15, p = 0.000%). Furthermore, the implied adjustment speeds change very little. Column (4) in Table 4 reports the results of using another single variable to represent each firm's target leverage -the trailing three-year average of the firm's own leverage ratio. (See Jalilvand and Harris [1984] or Shyam-Sunder and Myers [1999] ). This measure of target leverage also carries a small, significant coefficient and has little effect on the estimated adjustment speeds (λ 1 and λ 2 ). When we add our six X variables back into the specification (Column (5)), the estimated coefficients are again all significant and properly signed.
We conclude that neither the industry's lagged median leverage nor the firm's own, three-year trailing mean leverage can fully represent a firm's target debt ratio. Each variable adds some explanatory power, but does not displace the tradeoff-motivated independent variables. The estimated adjustment speeds vary from 27.5% to 30.2% annually, all in excess of most recent estimates in the literature. Because the trailing average ratio reduces the number of useable observations from 111,106 to 81,343, we proceed using the regression in Column (3) -the lagged industry median and our six firm-specific variables -as our main specification for the firm's target debt ratio. Table 5 reports the long run economic effects of the various firm characteristics on the typical firm's target capital ratio, according to our base specification in Column (3) of Table 4 . The first column of Table 5 repeats the short-run coefficients from Column (3) of Table 4 , for ease of reference. Recall that these coefficient estimates represent only the initial impact of firm characteristics on target leverage. Divide these coefficients by the estimated speed of adjustment (λ 1 ) to estimate their long-run effects on target leverage.
V. Target Debt Ratios
Column (2) reports a point estimate and t-statistic for each independent variable's long-run coefficient. The magnitude of each independent variable's effect on target leverage is shown in Columns (3), (4), and (5).
Column (3) reports the independent variable's sample standard deviation. Column (4) multiplies the long-run coefficient estimate from Column (2) by a one-standard deviation increase in the independent variable. This change in the long-run market debt ratio is expressed in the last column as a proportion of the target's samplewide standard deviation. For example, a one-standard deviation increase in EBIT_TA lowers MDR* by 0.91%, which is 0.042 target standard deviations. The largest absolute effects on long-run MDR are associated with FA_TA (0.16 target standard deviations) and MB (-0.13 target standard deviations). Rated's effect on target leverage is 0.55% on an average MDR* of 30.7%. This effect is considerably smaller than the effect estimated by Faulkender and Petersen [2003] , who find that rated firms have one-third higher debt ratios, ceteris paribus. Our estimated difference between having a debt rating (Rated = 1) and not having one (Rated = 0) is only 1.8%. In other words, having a debt rating raises the typical firm's debt ratio by only 0.083 target standard deviations in the long run. The impact of having a debt rating is more substantial for smaller firms. As shown in Table 6 below, the long-run coefficient on Rated is 0.044 (= 0.015 / 0.340) for firms in the three smallest size-deciles. The implied increase of 4.4% in MDR due to a bond rating is about half of Faulkender and Petersen's [2003] estimate.
The sources of variation in target debt ratios provide interesting information about the relative contributions of leverage determinants. The estimated target debt ratio has a mean of 30.68% and a standard deviation of 21.8% across all firms and years. The set of six X-variables explain 5.9%, the fixed effects explain 19.5%, and the year dummies explain 4.8%. Obviously, these sets of variables are correlated with one another, making it impossible to allocate their common explanatory power to one set or another. It is fair to say that the X-variables account for approximately 25% of the total variation in target debt ratios. Considering each year separately, the X variables alone explain between 19.3% and 33.2% of the annual variations in target debt ratios, with an overall average of 25.8%. The implied importance of fixed effects in determining the target debt ratios explains why including fixed effects in (2) affects estimated adjustment costs so greatly: the fixed effects provide substantially sharper estimates of target debt ratios, and hence permit adjustment speeds to be estimated with less bias. 60% 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 (1.61%). Firms in the middle two quartiles make much smaller adjustments, which also tend to move them closer to their target debt ratios.
VI. Convergence Toward the Target
An important feature of the adjustments in Figure 2 is that the mean adjustments exceed the median for all four quartiles. This suggests that most firms only make small BDR adjustments in most years. Occasionally, however, a firm's BDR change is quite large. This observation raises an important question about our specification in regression (12) that capital ratios adjust toward their targets at a constant proportional rate. Caballero and Engel [2003] demonstrate that partial adjustment specifications for macroeconomic time series tend to overstate adjustment speeds substantially when adjustments occur in discrete jump. In our case, however, we have many different firms, each specified to adjust at the same rate. In theory, therefore, the biases identified by Caballero and Engel
[2003] do not apply directly to our panel data set. However, to test for the potential bias, we simulated twenty sets of 100,000 data points for which the target moves stochastically every year, but the actual debt ratio is adjusted only periodically. For the randomly-chosen periods in which debt is adjusted, the firm adjusts completely to its target ratio. When we estimate a partial adjustment model on these generated datasets, we find that the estimated adjustment speed exceeds the true proportion of adjusting firms by less than 2%. (That is, if 30% of sample firms move to their target each year, the estimated adjustment speed is less than 0.306.) The average bias is statistically significant, but economically unimportant. See also the discussion of Table 8 in the next Section.
VII. Robustness
Our conclusions about target debt ratios and the speed with which firms adjust toward those targets are robust to changes in the sample, the time period examined, the estimation horizon, and the definition of leverage.
A. Size-Related Stability
Thus far, we have presented regression results only for the entire sample of firms. Some earlier writers omitted relatively small firms, presumably because they might encounter prohibitively large transaction costs when making small leverage adjustments. We therefore re-estimated our regressions for size-based subsamples. Specifically, we divided firms each year into groups according to CRSP's NYSE size deciles for equity market value.
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Decile 1 contains the largest firms, Decile 10 the smallest. The results in Table 6 show that the model (12) fits all firm sizes reasonably well. The X-variables' coefficient estimates do not vary greatly across the four sub-samples. Each sub-sample exhibits a reasonable adjustment speed, although it is noteworthy the adjustment speed varies (roughly) inversely with firm size. Even the slowest speed in Table 6 exceeds many past estimates in the literature. Although we have no evidence about why larger firms adjust their debt ratios less quickly, this finding is a strong effect in the data. Table 7 reports estimation results for three equal time periods, 1966-77, 1978-1989, and 1990-2001. We find that estimated adjustment speeds are quite similar across time periods, although the estimates in Table   7 all exceed the estimated 0.30 value from Table 3 . The other coefficient signs and significance are also 18 The uneven distribution of firms across the deciles reflects the fact that NYSE size deciles are being used to categorize firms drawn from the NYSE-AMEX-Nasdaq universe.
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B. Stability over Time
generally consistent across periods. One exception is the impact of depreciation expense (DEP_TA) on MDR*, which declines from -0.352 in the first time period to -0.045 in the last.
C. Stability over Estimation Horizons
Theory does not mandate a specific time interval between empirical observations. We therefore estimated the regression (12) for a variety of time intervals, to assess whether the adjustment speeds behave consistently with our assumption that a fixed proportion of the remaining leverage gap is closed each period.
The results are quite consistent with this assumption. Given Table 3 That is, 51% of the initial gap would be closed by the end of year 2. The actual estimate in the first column of Table 8 are remarkably consistent with the partial adjustment assumption underlying our main model (12). The adjustment speeds estimated for surprise price changes over these various horizons correspond more closely to their theoretical values. A one-year adjustment rate of 0.277 (from Table 3 Note that the short-run coefficients on the seven determinants of target leverage generally increase in absolute value as the estimation horizon lengthens in Table 8 . This reflects the fact that adjustment toward the target is greater for longer estimation horizons. With more complete adjustment (λ 1 ), the estimated coefficients on the X i, t naturally rise to maintain an unchanged long-run effect on MDR*.
D. Alternative "Leverage" Definitions
"Leverage" has a number of reasonable definitions, and other researchers have studied a variety of specific measures. We demonstrate in Table 9 that our conclusions about targets and adjustment speeds do not depend on our initial definition of leverage. We re-estimated (12) using three alternative (new) definitions of the market debt ratio: 
Debt term Long
For any of these debt ratios, the estimated adjustment speed is large (31.8% -37.1% annually), share price shocks are offset relatively quickly (23% -34.1% per year), and the determinants of target leverage generally carry significant coefficients with the appropriate sign.
VIII. Comparing Some Theories of Equilibrium Capital Structure
How does our "tradeoff" model of leverage stand up to the addition of explanatory variables derived from other models, such as the pecking order or market timing model? These alternate theories address primarily a firm's book debt ratio, so we evaluate them using the following regression:
Where Z i , t-1 is either FINDEF, the firm's financing deficit, defined as in Frank and Goyal [2003] , or BW_MB, Baker and Wurgler's [2002] "external finance weighted average" book-market ratio, defined on their paper's page 12.
The question is whether either of these variables affects the estimated coefficients on X i,t-1 or the lagged dependent variable in (13). The first three columns of Table 10 present these results. We first report the results of estimating (13) The last two columns of Table 10 repeat the analysis for the market-valued dependent variable (MDR).
The pecking order conclusions in column (4) are identical to the BDR results in column (2). The market timing variable in column (5) carries a significant coefficient with the proper sign. Unlike the BDR regression in column (3), however, both the single-lagged MB and the Baker-Wurgler MB variable are significant in the MDR regression with very similar coefficient estimates. We conclude that neither the pecking order nor the market timing hypotheses can replace our model of partial adjustment toward a target debt ratio, although each theory does seem to add some information to the regression explaining book or market debt ratios.
A recent paper by Welch [forthcoming] argues that managers passively tolerate almost any change in their MDR caused by share price fluctuations. His equation (11), which forms the basis for his Table 4 , is
where IDR 
For ease of comparison, we repeat our preferred specification (12) here:
The juxtaposition of (15) and (12) suggests that Welch's specification a) uses lagged MDR as the firm's target leverage; 21 b) uses EDR t as a starting point for adjustments (as we do); c) constrains firms to adjust equally quickly to both anticipated and unanticipated changes in their market debt ratios -both at a rate (1-α2).
Furthermore, (14) incorporates a simultaneity bias because Surprise it and the error term (µ i, t ) are similarly affected by realized share price fluctuations. This tends to bias α2 toward unity. By contrast, our modified 20
Note that Surprise it is very similar, it is not algebraically equal to Surp it
21
Treating the firm's lagged MDR as its target for the coming period implies that a share price shock becomes fully acceptable to the firm after one year, when the shock has passed into its lagged MDR value. dependent variable (∆MDR_P it ) produces a residual that is unaffected by contemporaneous changes in share price.
22 Table 11 illustrates that the restrictions imposed in (15) are largely responsible for the conclusions reached in Welch's paper. The first column reports the results of estimating (15) for our dataset, using FamaMacBeth as Welch does. The lagged debt ratio carries an estimated coefficient close to zero, and the implied debt ratio's coefficient is nearly unity. These estimates seem to imply that firms permanently accept the impact of share price changes on their leverage ratio. To determine the impact of requiring that EDR and IDR have equal coefficients, we remove this restriction in Column (2). The estimated coefficient on lagged MDR jumps from slightly negative (-0.07) to a large and positive (0.562) coefficient. The estimated coefficients on EDR i,t and Surprise it also diverge substantially. Interpreting the coefficient on EDR i,t as (1 -λ 1 ) implies that the typical firm in our sample adjusts roughly two-thirds of the gap between where it starts a year (EDR i,t ) and where it wishes to be (the target of MDR i,t-1 in this specification). This is a much different conclusion from that implied by column (1)! The third column of Table 11 explicitly models the firm's target debt ratio as βX it instead of assuming that firms wish to return to their previous period's debt ratio. The β coefficients are not reported here, but the impact of this assumption on the estimated adjustment speed is dramatic: it now appears that firms offset only 11.1% (= 1 -.889) of their target gaps in a single year. At this rate, it would take more than six years to move halfway toward the target, and the partial adjustment model of firm capital structure seems much less compelling.
There remains the potential positive correlation between Surprise i,t and the residual in (15). Our specification (12) eliminates this correlation by modifying the dependent variable, and the last column in Table   11 illustrates that the impact on the price-driven component of leverage change is dramatically affected.
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Although the adjustment speed on EDR remains unchanged, the estimated coefficient on Surp i, t falls from 22 We thank Yakov Amihud for alerting us to the adverse econometric effects of including the price term on both sides of the regression specification. unity to 0.19. In other words, column (3) implies that managers do not respond to share price changes, while column (4) implies that they offset 19% of these effects within a single year.
We do not offer any of the estimated coefficients in Table 11 as "correct". These simple FM results all exclude firm fixed effects, which we have shown in Table 2 are quite important. However , Table 11 clearly illustrates that regression specification can radically influence the inferences drawn from this sort of empirical undertaking.
IX. Summary and Conclusions
We find strong evidence that nonfinancial firms identified and pursued a target capital ratio during the last 35 years of the twentieth century. The evidence is equally strong across size classes and time periods. As earlier researchers have found, target debt ratios depend on well-accepted firm characteristics. Firms that are far from their target debt ratios take specific steps to close the gap, as evidenced by book debt ratio changes that offset the observed gap. Unlike some recent studies, we estimate that firms return relatively quickly to their target leverage ratios when they are shocked away. The mean sample firm acts to close its (market) leverage gap at the rate of at least 30% per year.
Our results strongly support the tradeoff theory of firm capital structure. We find no evidence to support recent allegations that managers passively accept market-induced changes in their firm's leverage.
Although the pecking order theory is not rejected by our tests, including the firm's financial deficit as an explanatory variable hardly affects the estimated coefficients on our "tradeoff theory" variables or the estimated speeds of adjustment. We also find that managerial market timing (à la Baker and Wurgler [2002] ) influences capital structure, but it does not nearly displace the partial-adjustment-tradeoff theory. Although the tradeoff theory's relevance cannot really be assessed without deciding whether a 30% annual adjustment speed is "slow" or "rapid", our results indicate that the adjustment speed is far from zero for U.S. nonfinancial firms. Table 2 ), used to test the pecking order hypothesis. Regression results for the model ∆MDR_P i, t+1 = (λ 1 β) X i,t -λ 1 EDR t + λ 2 Surp i, t+1 + δ i, t+1 (12) where ∆MDR_P is the change in market debt ratio (defined in (1)) between the end of period t-1 and the end of period t, adjusted for the effect of share price changes. EDR, defined in (11a), is the firm's debt ratio at t if its share price increases by the expected amount and managers make no adjustment to outstanding debt or equity. Surp, defined in (11b), measures the unanticipated impact of share prices on MDR during (t, t+1]. The (lagged) "X" variables determine a firm's long-run target debt ratio, and include EBIT_TA: earnings before interest and taxes as a proportion of total assets; MB: the market-to-book ratio of firm assets; DEP_TA: depreciation expense as a proportion of total assets; LnTA: natural log of total assets; and FA-TA: fixed assets as a proportion of total assets. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. MDR i, t+1 = β X i,t + δ i, t+1 Column (2): ∆MDR i, t+1 = (λ 1 β) X i,t -λ 1 MDR t + δ i, t+1 Column (3): ∆MDR i, t+1 = (λ 1 β) X i,t -λ 1 EDR t + δ i, t+1 Column (4): ∆MDR_P i, t+1 = (λ 1 β) X i,t -λ 1 EDR t + δ i, t+1 Column (5): ∆MDR_P i, t+1 = (λ 1 β) X i,t -λ 1 EDR t + λ 2 Surp i, t+1 + δ i,t+1
where ∆MDR_P is the change in market debt ratio (see (1)) between the end of period t-1 and the end of period t, adjusted for share price changes. EDR, defined in (11a), is the firm's debt ratio at t if its share price increases by the expected amount and managers make no adjustment to outstanding debt or equity. Surp, defined in (11b) measures the unanticipated impact of share prices on MDR during (t, t+1]. The (lagged) "X" variables determine a firm's long-run target debt ratio, and include EBIT_TA: earnings before interest and taxes as a proportion of total assets; MB: the market-to-book ratio of firm assets; DEP_TA: depreciation expense as a proportion of total assets; LnTA: natural log of total assets; and FA-TA: fixed assets as a proportion of total assets. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
where ∆MDR is the change in market debt ratio (see (1)) between the end of period t-1 and the end of period t. EDR, defined in (11a), is the firm's debt ratio at t+1 if its share price increases by the expected amount. Surp, defined in (11b) measures the unanticipated impact of share prices on MDR during (t, t+1]. The (lagged) "X" variables determine a firm's long-run target debt ratio, and include EBIT_TA: earnings before interest and taxes as a proportion of total assets; MB: the market-to-book ratio of firm assets; DEP_TA: depreciation expense as a proportion of total assets; LnTA: natural log of total assets; and FA-TA: fixed assets as a proportion of total assets. RATED: Dummy variable equal to one (zero) if the firm has a public debt rating in Compustat. T-statistics are shown in parentheses.
(1) Using the coefficients from Column (3) of Table 4 , we report the impact of a one standard deviation change in each independent variable on the long-run target debt ratio. The short-run coefficients in Column (1) (1) Short-run coefficients (from Table 4 Each year, we divided the universe of firms into ten groups, based on CRSP's equity value size deciles for NYSE-traded firms in that year. Decile #1 contains the largest firms. The regression is estimated using the instrumental variables method described in Table 2 . For each size grouping, we then estimate the regression ∆MDR_P i, t+1 = (λ 1 β) X i,t -λ 1 EDR t + λ 2 Surp i, t+1 + δ i, t+1
where ∆MDR_P is the share price-adjusted change in market debt ratio (see (1)) between the end of period t-1 and the end of period t. EDR, defined in (11a), is the firm's debt ratio at t+1 if its share price increases by the expected amount. Surp, defined in (11b) measures the unanticipated impact of share prices on MDR during (t, t+1]. The (lagged) "X" variables determine a firm's long-run target debt ratio, and include EBIT_TA: earnings before interest and taxes as a proportion of total assets; MB: the market-to-book ratio of firm assets; DEP_TA: depreciation expense as a proportion of total assets; LnTA: natural log of total assets; and FA-TA: fixed assets as a proportion of total assets. RATED: Dummy variable equal to one (zero) if the firm has a public debt rating in Compustat. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
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where ∆MDR is the change in market debt ratio (see (1)) between the end of period t-1 and the end of period t. EDR, defined in (11a), is the firm's debt ratio at t+1 if its share price increases by the expected amount. Surp, defined in (11b) measures the unanticipated impact of share prices on MDR during (t, t+1]. The (lagged) "X" variables determine a firm's long-run target debt ratio, and include EBIT_TA: earnings before interest and taxes as a proportion of total assets; MB: the market-to-book ratio of firm assets; DEP_TA: depreciation expense as a proportion of total assets; LnTA: natural log of total assets; and FA-TA: fixed assets as a proportion of total assets. RATED: Dummy variable equal to one (zero) if the firm has a public debt rating in Compustat. The regression is estimated using the instrumental variables method described in ∆MDR_P i, t = (λ 1 β) X i,t-k -λ 1 EDR t-k + λ 2 Surp i t + δ i, t
using different intervals ("k"= 2, 3, 4, or 5 years). As in the preceding tables, ∆MDR is the change in market debt ratio between the start of period t-k and the end of period t. EDR, defined in (11a), is the firm's debt ratio at t if its share price increases by the expected amount. Surp, defined in (11b) measures the unanticipated impact of share prices on MDR. The lagged (t-k) "X" variables determine a firm's long-run target debt ratio, and include EBIT_TA: earnings before interest and taxes as a proportion of total assets; MB: the market-to-book ratio of firm assets; DEP_TA: depreciation expense as a proportion of total assets; LnTA: natural log of total assets; and FA-TA: fixed assets as a proportion of total assets. RATED: Dummy variable equal to one (zero) if the firm has a public debt rating in Compustat. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. Column (2): MDR i,t+1 = α0 + α1 MDR i,t + α2 {EDR i, t } + α3 { Surprise i, t } + µ i, t+1
Column (3): MDR i,t+1 = α0 + α1 {EDR i, t } + α2 { Surprise i, t+1 } + (λ 1 β) X i,t + µ i, t+1
Column (4): ∆MDR_P i,t+1 = (λ 1 β) X i,t -λ 1 EDR t + λ 2 Surp t+1 + µ i, t+1
EDR, defined in (11a), is the firm's debt ratio at t+1 if its share price increases by the expected amount. Surp, defined in (11b) measures the unanticipated impact of share prices on MDR. Surprise is defined as (IDR -EDR). The (lagged) firm characteristics that determine its long-run target debt ratio: EBIT_TA: earnings before interest and taxes as a proportion of total assets; MB: the market-to-book ratio of firm assets; DEP_TA: depreciation expense as a proportion of total assets; LnTA: natural log of total assets; and FA-TA: fixed assets as a proportion of total assets. Rated: Dummy variable equal to one (zero) if the firm has a public debt rating in Compustat.
T-statistics are shown in parentheses. All estimations undertaken using Fama-MacBeth methodology. 
